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The IS/LM-AD/AS-model is still the standard framework for teaching undergradu-
ate macroeconomics. However, it gets more and more criticized for several aspects.
The most import points in our opinion are that the model is unable to deal with
an explicit monetary policy rule with the interest rate as the central bank’s policy
instrument [see Romer (2000)] and that it is expressed in terms of the price level and
not of inﬂation [see Walsh (2002)].1 To get rid of these problems, Boﬁnger, Meyer,
and Wollmersh¨ auser (2006) introduce a static approximation of the standard New
Keynesian model where the interest rate is the instrument of the monetary author-
ity.2 Within this framework, they are able to discuss diﬀerent monetary policy
regimes at an intermediate level.
Our paper moreover oﬀers an approach which enables us to discuss both the
commitment vs. discretion debate of the New Keynesian literature and the time-
inconsistency problem ` a la Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) combined in a uniﬁed
framework.3 This can be worthwhile especially for teaching intermediate macroeco-
nomics. The aim of this paper is thus to solve the inconsistency problem within the
static New Keynesian model and to derive time-consistent (or: stable) interest rate
rules of Taylor-type. In contrast to the famous Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon
approach, New Keynesian models also consider the demand side of the economy
and the central bank cannot directly control for the inﬂation rate.4 Instead, the
mechanism is as follows. (i) The central bank commits itself to follow an interest
rate rule of Taylor-type. (ii) Private agents form inﬂation expectations. (iii) The
central bank sets the interest rate and the households adjust their consumption
expenditures according to the Euler consumption equation. (iv) Inﬂation is then
determined by expected future inﬂation and the output realization via the New
Keynesian Phillips curve.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. Under a completely standard calibration in-
1Other unsatisfactory features are the lack of a microfoundation and the exogeneity of expectations
[see Romer (2000)].
2See Boﬁnger, Meyer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2009) for the corresponding open economy framework.
3Boﬁnger, Meyer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2006) already highlight that their approach can be extended
for this exercise. However, they only point out that an output gap target above zero as in Barro
and Gordon (1983a) leads to an inﬂation bias which was already shown by Clarida, Gal´ ı, and
Gertler (1999) within the dynamic New Keynesian model.
4More precisely, Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) assume that the policymaker controls an instrument
which has a direct connection to the inﬂation rate – for instance, the money growth rate. The
economy is just represented by a Phillips curve and does not consider any demand eﬀects.
1cluding a time preference rate of the monetary authority equal to the long-run
interest rate, the standard Taylor rule is stable in the presence of a cost-push shock.
The central bank thus does not have an incentive to deviate from the announced rule
and to switch over to the inconsistent policy regime. However, there exists a multi-
plicity of stable Taylor rules which are superior to the standard one. In contrast to
the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a monetary rule such
that the cost and beneﬁt resulting from inconsistent policy coincide – which implies
a net gain of inconsistent policy behavior equal to zero – is not optimal. Instead,
the solution can be enhanced by moving into the time-consistent area where the net
gain of inconsistent monetary policy is negative. Moreover and in contrast to Barro
and Gordon (1983a,b), there exists no stable monetary policy rule maximizing the
welfare. The stable area furthermore becomes larger when assuming an additional
term in the social loss function concerning interest rate stability. This implies that
the reputation of the central bank naturally improves if the policy maker is also con-
cerned about stabilizing the interest rate. Our results remain robust with respect
to the analysis of simultaneous supply and demand shocks.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 shortly describes the applied
model. In Section 3, we turn to monetary policy issues including the optimal dis-
cretionary monetary policy, simple Taylor rules, and the incentive to deviate from
the announced policy rule. We moreover derive the continuum of time-consistent
Taylor rules, discuss the problem of ﬁnding an optimal stable rule, and check our
results for robustness. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
Following Boﬁnger, Meyer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2006), we apply a static approx-
imation of the microfounded canonical New Keynesian model. The model can be
represented by a three-dimensional equation system including an IS curve, a Phillips
curve, and a monetary policy rule. The IS curve is given by
x = a − br + ε1 (1)
2where x denotes the output gap which is deﬁned as the deviation of output from
its eﬃcient level. a is a constant. b represents the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution. r is the real interest rate and ε1 denotes a demand shock. As shown in
the Appendix, the demand shock can also be interpreted as a shock to aggregate
technology or innovation.5
The second building block of the model is the static approximation of the New
Keynesian Phillips curve
π = πe + δx + ε2 (2)
where π and πe represent current and expected future inﬂation, respectively. δ is
the slope of the Phillips curve. ε2 represents a cost-push shock.
In contrast to the demand shock, the supply shock causes a trade-oﬀ for the
monetary authority between stabilizing output and inﬂation. Therefore, we will
restrict our analysis to cost-push shocks. However, we will re-consider the demand
shock for a robustness check at the end of our analysis.
3 Monetary Policy
In the following we will discuss diﬀerent types of policy regimes, namely the optimal
discretionary monetary policy, D, the commitment regime ` a la Taylor, TR, and
the regime under inconsistent policy, IP. Independently of the assumed type of
monetary policy, the central bank seeks to minimize a social loss function.
As shown by Gal´ ı (2008, Chapter 4) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 6), the
second order approximation of the households’ utility function delivers a quadratic
loss function which represents ﬂexible inﬂation targeting in the spirit of Svensson
(1999). The static approximation of this function is given by
V = (π − πT)2 + λx2 (3)
where πT represents the target inﬂation rate and λ ∈ [0,1] is the central bank’s
5In the dynamic version of the standard New Keynesian model, it can moreover be shown that
in the case of an expansionary but persistent technology shock, the resulting demand shock is
contractionary because the current output level reacts less expansionary than its natural counter-
part. The output gap consequently declines. In the case of a permanent innovation, the resulting
technology shock however has an expansionary impact on the output gap.
3preference parameter on stabilizing the output gap as in Boﬁnger, Meyer, and
Wollmersh¨ auser (2006, 2009). In the case λ = 0, the central bank’s preferences
represent a strict inﬂation targeting regime, i.e. the monetary authority is just
concerned about stabilizing inﬂation.
Following Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), we additionally assume that the mon-
etary authority’s target of the output gap is positive, i.e. xT > 0.6 An economic
rationale is that e.g. monopolistic distortions or taxes keep potential output below
its eﬃcient level [see Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999)]. Then the social loss is given
by
V = (π − πT)2 + λ(x − xT)2 (4)
3.1 The discretionary monetary policy regime
In this section, we will derive the optimal discretionary monetary policy. In this
regime, the expected inﬂation rate is taken as given for the central bank since the
monetary authority applies a sequential optimization. Therefore, it is unable to
make credible announcements concerning the design of monetary policy that could
inﬂuence private expectations.
The central bank minimizes the social loss (4) subjected to the Phillips curve
(2).7 Inserting the Phillips curve (2) in the social loss function (4) and optimizing
the resulting equation with respect to the output gap yields the following ﬁrst order
condition:
2δ(πe + δx + ε2 − πT) + 2λ(x − xT) = 0
⇔ x = −
δ
δ2 + λ
(πe − πT + ε2) +
λ
λ + δ2xT (5)
Following Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), we assume that private expectations about
inﬂation are formed before the shocks occur. This implies that when forming expec-
tations about inﬂation, the shocks (ε1 and ε2) are not included in the information
6An alternative approach to include the problem of time-inconsistency into the model would be to
assume an asymmetric loss function [see Cukiermann and Gerlach (2003), Nobay and Peel (2003),
or Ruge-Murcia (2003)]. However, there is no micro-foundation for such a loss function at all. We
moreover want to remain as close as possible to the Barro and Gordon approach. In addition,
there is empirical evidence for both approaches [see e.g. Ireland (1999) and Gerlach (2003)].
7Note that the IS curve is not a binding restriction in this case.
4set of private agents [see also Walsh (2003), Ch. 8].
Inserting (5) in the Phillips curve and taking rational expectations conditional
on the set of private information, I, with E[ε2|I] = 0, yields the expected inﬂation
rate under discretionary monetary policy.




Note that in the case of a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting regime implying λ > 0, expected
inﬂation is above the central bank’s target level when the monetary authority aims
for a positive output gap.





The solution of the output gap is independent of the corresponding target level, xT,
and moreover coincides with the discretionary solution in the case where the central






D [cf. Clarida, Gal´ ı,
and Gertler (1999)].
However, this does not hold for the solution of inﬂation. By inserting (6) and
(7) in the Phillips curve, we obtain





λ + δ2ε2 (8)
The central bank’s target level of the output gap represents an additional term [or:
inﬂation bias] in the solution of inﬂation which pushes inﬂation above its target level.
Since under rational expectations the model structure including the loss function is
known by private agents, the intention of the central bank to push the output gap
above its natural level fails. Instead, the solution of output remains unchanged and
that of inﬂation is ’biased’.
This result also holds in the absence of a supply shock, i.e. ε2 = 0. Moreover,
equation (8) implies that inﬂation only coincides with its target level when the
central bank’s preferences represent strict inﬂation targeting (λ = 0). This is a
very intuitive result since in this case, the central bank is not concerned about the
5output gap at all.
When combining (7) and (8), discretionary monetary policy can be expressed
as a targeting rule [see Svensson (1999)] given by






implying a negative relationship between the stabilization of inﬂation and the output
gap at the respective target level.
Finally, the social loss under discretionary monetary policy can be derived by











If a cost-push shock is existent, i.e. ε2  = 0, the loss is strictly positive as long as
λ > 0.
3.2 Simple rule
In this section, we will derive the social loss when the central bank credibly commits
itself to follow a simple monetary policy rule of Taylor-type and thus inﬂuences
private expectations.
The Taylor rule is commonly represented as
i = iT + kπ(π − πT) + kx(x − xT) (11)
where kx and kπ are the elasticities of the nominal interest rate, i, with respect to
the deviation of the output gap and the inﬂation rate from their respective target
level. In the following, we will refer to them as Taylor rule coeﬃcients. The real
interest rate which is the argument of the IS curve (1) is then obtained from the
nominal interest rate via the well-known Fisher equation.
Note that the following condition is necessary to ensure that the dynamic coun-
terpart of our model has a unique and stable equilibrium [see Bullard and Mitra
6(2002) or Walsh (2003), Chap. 5]
δ(kπ − 1) + (1 − β)kx > 0 (12)
where β ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor of private households. The stability of the
whole system thus crucially depends on the Taylor rule coeﬃcients. In the following,
we will assume that the Taylor principle, kπ > 1, and the condition kx > 0 hold.
Then the stability condition (12) is obviously satisﬁed.
iT is the central bank’s target level of the nominal interest rate which follows
iT = rT + πT (13)
The corresponding target level of the real interest rate, rT, follows from the IS




(a − xT) (14)
Note that the target level of the real interest rate coincides with its natural level,
rn = a
b, in the borderline case xT = 0.8
Inserting the Taylor rule (11) with (13) and (14) in the IS curve (1), yields
x = (1 + bkx)xT − bkxx + b(πe − πT) − bkπ(π − πT)




b(πe − πT) − bkπ(π − πT)
￿
(15)
By plugging this expression into the Phillips curve (2) and taking rational expec-
tations, we obtain the expected inﬂation rate under the monetary policy regime
TR.




Under our assumptions concerning kπ and kx, expected inﬂation exceeds the target
level in the case of a positive target level of the output gap. However, this holds
independently of the central bank’s preferences on stabilizing output. By contrast
8Remark: A natural level denotes the value of a variable in a non-distorted framework.
7and as shown in the last section, under discretionary monetary policy expected
inﬂation exceeds its target level only in the case of ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, λ > 0
[cf. equation (6)].
When combining (16) and the Phillips curve (2), we obtain the solution path of












where α ≡ 1 + b(kx + δkπ). Equivalently to the case of the discretionary monetary
policy, the solution of the output gap is independent of its target level. Hence,
equation (17) also represents the solution of the borderline case xT = 0 where the
central bank targets a closed output gap. Again, this result does not hold for the
solution of inﬂation since equation (18) is not only a function of the target level of
inﬂation but also of the output gap target. The introduction of a positive target
level of the output gap thus leads to higher inﬂation while the resulting output gap
remains unchanged.
In order to obtain the social loss under the policy regime TR for arbitrary
coeﬃcients kπ and kx, we ﬁnally insert the solutions of the output gap and inﬂation
in the welfare function (4).

















From (19) it directly follows that the social loss approaches inﬁnity, if kπ tends
to unity. In this limit case the social loss exceeds that under discretionary monetary
policy (10). The rationale is the reaction of expected inﬂation which according to
(16) also tends to inﬁnity, if kπ → 1.
The following numerical example however shows that when applying a standard
calibration, the social loss under discretionary monetary policy clearly exceeds that
under TR. The Taylor rule regime is then preferable. As standard in the New
Keynesian literature, we assume the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, b, to
be equal to one. Under commonly chosen deep parameters, the slope of the Phillips
curve is 0.0858 implying an average price duration of four quarters and an annual
8nominal interest rate of about 4%. Following Svensson (1999), we set the ﬂexible
inﬂation targeting parameter λ to 0.5. We arbitrarily assume the target level of the
output gap to be 0.1 implying that the potential output level is 10% higher than
the current one. The shock impact is normalized to one.
Figure 1: Comparing the social loss under the regime TR [grey area] and D [white area]
Under this standard calibration, Figure 1 depicts the social loss in the regime
TR for diﬀerent combinations of kπ and kx [grey area] as well as the loss under
regime D [white shaded area]. The social loss under TR can exceed that under
D, when the Taylor rule coeﬃcient kπ tends to unity. However, if kπ is suﬃciently
larger than one and kx is suﬃciently larger than zero, V |TR is preferable to V |D.9
In the case of standard Taylor rule, i.e. kπ = 1.5 and kx = 0.5, the social loss in
the regime TR is signiﬁcantly lower than in the discretionary case. The numerical
evaluation of V |D and V |TR yields
V |TR = 2.0120 < 2.4956 = V |D (20)
The credible commitment to the standard monetary policy rule yields a signiﬁcant
welfare gain via the expectation channel which is not active in the discretionary
9Note that there also exists a small area with V |TR > V |D, if kx is suﬃciently small and kπ is
suﬃciently large.
9case.10 The social loss under D exceeds that under TP by about 24%.
3.3 Inconsistent Policy
In this section, we will show that the central bank has an incentive to deviate from
the announced Taylor rule if the monetary authority is faced with a purely static
one-period optimization approach.
If the central bank credibly announces to follow a speciﬁcally calibrated Taylor
rule, expected inﬂation is tied at a given level according to (16). However, the
central bank can then achieve a welfare gain by re-optimizing in a discretionary
manner. In this case, the monetary authority will not implement the announced
policy rule. We will refer to this policy regime as inconsistent monetary policy, IP.
The maximization problem under IP is given by
max
x,π
L = (π − πT)2 + λ(x − xT)2
s.t. π = πe + δx + ε2 (21)
πe = πe|TR
As in the discretionary case, the ﬁrst order condition with respect to the output









λ + δ2xT (22)
Equation (22) just deviates from (5) via the formation of the expected inﬂation
rate.
By inserting (16) in (22), we obtain the solution of the output gap under the











λ + δ2ε2 (23)
10Remark: In the dynamic New Keynesian framework, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999) and Wood-
ford (1999) show that a commitment strategy can be advantageous even in the absence of the
inﬂation bias. See Dennis (2010) for an insightful discussion of this topic.
10Again, the solution of inﬂation is then obtained via the Phillips curve (2).









In contrast to the purely discretionary monetary policy and the regime under com-
mitment to a Taylor rule, the solution of the output gap (23) now depends on its
target level. This implies that the central bank’s intention to push output above its
natural level can now be achieved. However and in line with our previous ﬁnding
under discretionary monetary policy, inﬂation only coincides with its target level
when the central bank follows strict inﬂation targeting.
The combination of (23) and (24) yields the same targeting rule as in the dis-
cretionary case [cf. (9)]:






The social loss under inconsistent monetary policy can ﬁnally be obtained by










By deﬁnition, V |TR must exceed V |IP, i.e. the deviation from the announced
Taylor rule yields a welfare enhancement. The numerical evaluation for the two
policy regimes under the standard parameterizations delivers
V |IP = 1.6875 < 2.0120 = V |TR (27)
The welfare gain resulting from the inconsistent policy regime when announcing a
standard Taylor rule is thus about 19%.
3.4 Time-Consistent Simple Rules
In this section, we will derive a continuum of time-consistent (or: stable) simple
rules. This is done by assuming a long-run planning horizon of the monetary au-
thority as in Barro and Gordon (1983a,b).
11As shown in last section, the central bank has an incentive to re-optimize, if
it credibly announces to follow a commitment strategy. If its announcements are
not credible, private expectations are given for the central bank and the monetary
authority must follow a discretionary monetary policy. By assuming that the central
bank looses its reputation, if it deviates once from its announcement, i.e. if the
central bank switches over to the regime IP, one can ﬁnd both a continuum of
time-consistent and inconsistent simple rules. More precisely, we assume that the
central bank looses its reputation for exactly one period when deviating once, i.e.
a punishment interval of one period.11 The announcements of the central bank will
then no longer be credible such that private agents will form their expectations as
in the discretionary case.
In this framework ` a la Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), the central bank is faced
with a simple cost-beneﬁt calculation where the beneﬁt, B, is the welfare gain
resulting from the inconsistent policy in comparison to the implementation of the
announced Taylor rule, V |TR − V |IP. The cost, C, on the other hand is the
discounted next period welfare loss resulting from the sacriﬁce in the central bank’s
reputation, V |D − V |TR. The net gain, N, of the inconsistent policy is then given
by12
N = B − C = (V |TR − V |IP) −
1
1 + z
(V |D − V |TR) (28)
Equation (28) implies that there exists a subjective time preference rate, z, such
that the net gain is zero. In this case, the monetary authority is indiﬀerent between
switching over to IP and executing the announced rule. This critical time preference
rate, z∗, is given by
z∗ =
V |D − V |TR
V |TR − V |IP
− 1 ⇔ N = 0 (29)
11Alternatively, one can analyze the case where the central bank looses its reputation for all times
when deviating once. However, the qualitative results remain unchanged.
12By assuming that the central bank looses its reputation for all times when deviating once from
the announcement, the total gain resulting from IP would be given by
N′ = B − C′ =
￿





















V |D − V |TR
￿
12A central bank with a rate of time preference larger than z∗, i.e. a monetary
authority whose planning horizon is rather short, consequently expects N > 0.
Correspondingly, a more long-run oriented central bank, z < z∗, expects N < 0, i.e.
it would not switch over to the regime IP.
In our numerical example, the critical time preference rate z∗ is 0.4903. The
corresponding discount factor, 1/(1 + z∗), is then about 0.67 implying a central
bank whose planning horizon is rather short. In the monetary economics literature,
a basic assumption is that the subjective preference rate coincides with the long-
run real interest rate.13 The latter is typically chosen to be equal to 4% which is
clearly below the critical subjective rate of time preference. Hence, such a central
bank is farsighted and does not yield a net gain from inconsistent monetary policy.
Assuming z = 0.04, the standard Taylor rule is stable.
Figure 2: Stable and unstable simple rules
Figure 2 illustrates the net gain resulting from the deviation from the announced
simple rule for diﬀerent combinations of Taylor rule coeﬃcients. The white shaded
area indicates the zero plane. The intersection of this area and the net gain function
consequently delivers the speciﬁc kπ/kx-combinations which result in N = 0. This
13As already mentioned, the social loss function (3) can be derived by a second order approxima-
tion of the household’s utility function. Hence, the discount factors of the central bank and the
households must coincide. Further note that when assuming a zero-inﬂation steady state, the real
interest rate is equal to its nominal counterpart in the long-run.
13implies that the kπ/kx-combinations within the white area on the right-hand side
of Figure 2 deliver N < 0 since the cost exceeds the beneﬁt of inconsistent policy.
These rules are consequently time-consistent.14 The limit case N = 0 just holds for
the boundary of this area. It can moreover be observed from Figure 2 that a Taylor
rule with kx = 0 is never stable given our assumptions.
As in Barro and Gordon (1983a), there exists a continuum of reputational equi-
libria where the central bank has no incentive to deviate from the announced mon-
etary policy. The monetary authority will consequently not switch over to incon-
sistent policy. Announcing such a rule is necessarily credible. The next step is to
ﬁnd an optimal stable interest rate rule.
Since the policy maker follows a Taylor rule – satisfying the Taylor principle
and kx > 0 – the monetary authority has to control for two parameters, kπ and
kx. In contrast to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach where the central
bank can directly control the inﬂation rate, the optimal stable policy must now be
determined in a three-dimensional space. Moreover, the optimal choice in Barro
and Gordon (1983a) is a point in the intersection of the function B and C since
it minimizes the social loss. In our approach, the social loss resulting from the



















































Figure 3: The net gain N and the social loss under TR for diﬀerent Taylor rule coeﬃcients
For illustrating this issue, we will ﬁx one Taylor coeﬃcient for the moment
14Remark: When disregarding the Taylor principle, i.e. by allowing kπ < 0, we moreover obtain a
second continuum of stable simple rules. This is a plausible result since the social loss under TR
(19) is a function in kπ of fourth-order implying that for a given kx there can exist up to four
diﬀerent real-valued solutions of kπ.
14in order to obtain a two-dimensional decision problem. Figure 3 illustrates the
corresponding partial social loss function under TR (dashed lines) and the net
gain from the deviation from the announced rule (solid lines) when holding the
Taylor rule coeﬃcient on the output gap constant.15 The ﬁgure indicates that under
constant kx there always exists a coeﬃcient on inﬂation such that the resulting social
loss is optimal. These (restricted) optima are denoted with a black dot. Moreover,
Figure 3 shows that the kπ/kx-combinations which result in N = 0 can be enhanced
as they do not yield an optimal loss for given kx.
For instance, the combination kx = 0.5 and kπ = 1.35 yields N = 0. However,
this combination of Taylor rule coeﬃcients is not optimal as the social loss declines
when increasing the Taylor rule coeﬃcient on inﬂation up to 1.8. This combination
is within the stable area which is a general result as all (restricted) optima are within
the stable area and not in the intersection of B and C. By contrast, the optimal
policy choice in Barro and Gordon (1983a) is in the intersection of cost and beneﬁt
resulting from inconsistent monetary policy. Furthermore, Figure 3 indicates that
the larger the Taylor rule coeﬃcient, kx, the larger is the second one, kπ, in the
optimum. This result also holds vice versa when kπ is constant.
Figure 4: Optimal Taylor rule coeﬃcients
15When holding kπ constant, we obtain a totally equivalent outcome.
15Figure 4 depicts these optimal coeﬃcients, kopt.
π and kopt.
x , when respectively
taking kx and kπ as given. It can directly be observed that the corresponding
lines of partial optima do not have an intersection. Consequently, there does not
exists a globally optimal choice of Taylor rule parameters when both coeﬃcients
are variable. Since the loss decreases in both coeﬃcients [cf. Figure 3], the minimal
loss is obtained in the limit case kπ → ∞ and kx → ∞. In Figure 4, this fact is
indicated with a black arrow.
All in all, the unsatisfactory feature that there exists a multiplicity of stable
monetary policy rules remains [see Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999)]. However,
Taylor rule coeﬃcients resulting in N = 0 can be improved when moving into the
stable area which contrasts with Barro and Gordon (1983a). Moreover, there exists
no globally optimal stable Taylor rule.
3.5 Extensions
For checking the robustness of the previous results, we will now turn to a monetary
authority which is also concerned about stabilizing the interest rate as in Svensson
(2000). The extended social loss function then looks as follows
V ′ = (π − πT)2 + λ(x − xT)2 + γ(i − iT)2 (30)
with λ > γ > 0. Although (30) cannot be derived from the household’s utility func-
tion in the canonical New Keynesian framework, Kobayashi (2008) and Teranishi
(2008) show that in a framework where the ﬁnancial sector has a non-trivial role,
the social loss function should include a positive weight on a ﬁnancial variable. We
set γ to 0.05.
The proceeding for obtaining the social loss for the diﬀerent policy designs is
equivalent to that in the previous sections.16
16See the Appendix for the diﬀerent social losses in the diﬀerent policy regimes with γ > 0 and the
respective derivations.
163.5.1 The Impact of Stabilizing the Interest Rate




D = 6.5586 > V |
′
TR = 2.1044 > V |
′
IP = 1.6987 (31)
resulting in a critical rate of time preference equal to 9.9790. the standard Taylor
rule is only unstable when assuming very myopic considerations of the central bank.
Under our standard calibration including z = 0.04, the standard Taylor rule however
remains stable when extending the social loss function.
Figure 5: Stable and unstable simple rules with γ > 0
Figure 5 shows the net gain resulting from the deviation of the announced Tay-
lor rule for diﬀerent kπ/kx-combinations. The qualitative results also remain un-
changed in comparison to the case with γ = 0. However, it is worth mentioning
that the stable area, i.e. the set of kπ/kx-combinations that do not cause any in-
centive for the monetary authority to switch over to inconsistent policy, becomes
larger when assuming γ > 0. This implies that the reputation of the central bank
naturally improves if the policy maker is also concerned about stabilizing the inter-
est rate. The rationale is that the social loss under discretionary monetary policy
17relatively increases more than those under inconsistent policy and under the Taylor
rule. As a result, the cost of inconsistent policy, C, increases more than the beneﬁt,
B.
In contrast to the case γ = 0, a Taylor rule with kx = 0 may be time-consistent
if the Taylor rule coeﬃcient on inﬂation is rather small.
3.5.2 Simultaneous Supply and Demand Shocks
As already mentioned and as shown in the Appendix, the demand shock can be
interpreted as a shock to aggregate technology which is typically assumed to be
expansionary (ψ > 0). In our notation this implies ε1 < 0 since a technology shock
causes the natural level, y∗, to increase more than the current one, y, leading to a
decline in the output gap, x ≡ y − y∗.
It is a well-known that a pure demand shock can be totally compensated by
discretionary monetary policy in the case γ = 0. This can be directly observed
from the IS curve (1).17 Hence, we will analyze simultaneous supply and demand
shocks in the following. For the sake of simplicity, we will also normalize the impact
of the demand shock to one, i.e. ε1 = −1.
Then, the numerical evaluation of the diﬀerent policy regimes yields
V |
′
D = 6.4250 > V |
′
TR = 2.7489 > V |
′
IP = 1.6992 (32)
implying a critical subjective discount factor equal to 2.5020. Hence, the stan-
dard Taylor rule still remains stable when additionally considering an technological
innovation.
Figure 6 shows the net gain resulting from a deviation from the announced Taylor
rule for a continuum of kπ/kx-combinations. The continuum of stable Taylor rules
now becomes smaller when considering the contractionary demand shock [cf. Figure
5].18 The rationale is that the social loss under the commitment strategy increases
relative to those under inconsistent and discretionary policy. Consequently, the
cost resulting from the loss in the central bank’s reputation declines leading to an
increasing incentive to switch over to inconsistent policy.
17In this speciﬁc case, the discretionary monetary policy would obviously be the ﬁrst best solution.
18As expected, the stable area becomes larger when assuming the demand shock to be expansionary,
too, i.e. ε1 = ε2 = 1.
18Figure 6: Stable and unstable simple rules – simultaneous supply and demand shocks
(ε1 < 0 and ε2 > 0)
4 Conclusion
We implement the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach in a static approx-
imation of the canonical New Keynesian model. Within this framework, we are
able to discuss both the commitment vs. discretion debate of the New Keynesian
literature and the time-inconsistency problem of Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) in a
uniﬁed framework. This can be worthwhile especially for teaching macroeconomics
at an intermediate level.
We ﬁrst show that commitment strategies can be advantageous to discretionary
monetary policy. Second, we show that these policy rules cause the monetary
authority to deviate from their announcements since the re-optimization yields a
welfare gain. By assuming a long-run planning horizon of the central bank and that
the monetary authority looses its reputation when switching over to inconsistent
policy, we ﬁnd a continuum of stable interest rate rules of Taylor-type. In contrast
to the Kydland/Prescott-Barro/Gordon approach, implementing a monetary rule
such that the cost and beneﬁt resulting from inconsistent policy coincide, is not op-
timal. Instead, the solution can be enhanced by moving into the stable area where
the net gain of inconsistent monetary policy behavior is negative. By introducing an
19additional term in the social loss function concerning interest rate stabilization, the
continuum of stable Taylor rules becomes larger. This implies that the reputation
of the monetary authority naturally improves when it is also concerned about stabi-
lizing the interest rate. Third, we ﬁnd that under a standard calibration including
a time preference rate equal to the long-run interest rate, the standard Taylor rule
is time-consistent for the cost-push shock as well as for simultaneous supply and
demand shocks. Fourth, there does not exist a stable Taylor rule in explicit form
which minimizes the social loss.
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Appendix
A Derivation of the demand shock
Firms need only one input factor, labor which is denoted by N. The production
function is then simply given by
Y = ΨN (A.1)
where Y is output and Ψ represents a shock to aggregate productivity.19





= const. ⇔ w = ψ (A.2)
The Euler consumption equation and the labor supply equation follow from the
utility maximization of the representative household.
y = a − br (A.3)




where η represents the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Subtracting the natural level from the Euler equation yields20
x ≡ y − y∗ = a − br − y∗ (A.5)
Log-linearizing the production function (A.1) expressed in natural levels and insert-
19In the following, capital letters denote variables in non-log-linearized form, while small latter
denote log-linearized variables.
20In the following, an asterisk denotes a natural variables, i.e. without any nominal or real rigidity.
22ing the resulting equation in (A.5) considering (A.2) and (A.4), yields






1+bη > 0, a shock to aggregate technology can thus be interpreted as a
contractionary demand shock. The rationale is that the natural level increases
more to an expansionary shock to productivity than the distorted actual output
level such that the diﬀerence – the output gap – decreases.
B Social Losses with γ > 0 and ε1  = 0 and ε2  = 0
The modiﬁed loss function now contains an additional term concerning nominal
interest rate stabilization.
V ′ = (π − πT)2 + λ(x − xT)2 + γ(i − iT)2 (B.1)
B.1 Simple rule
The proceeding for deriving the social loss is equivalent to that in the main text.
Since we analyze calibrated instead of optimal simple rules, private expectations
are thus not altered by the modiﬁed loss function and still follow (16)




When combining (16) and the Phillips curve (2), we obtain the solution path of






















The additional demand shock causes an upward-pressure on both inﬂation and the
output gap.
Finally, we need the solution for the nominal interest rate. Therefore, we insert
23(B.3) and (B.4) in the Taylor rule (11).
i|
′





1 + b(kx + kπδ)
ε1 +
kπ
1 + b(kx + kπδ)
ε2 (B.5)
In order to obtain the social loss under the policy regime TR for arbitrary
coeﬃcients kπ and kx, we insert the solutions of the output gap, inﬂation, and the






























1 + b(kx + kπδ)
ε1 +
kπ




Naturally, the latter expression simpliﬁes to (19), if γ = 0 and ε1 = 0.
B.2 Optimal discretionary monetary policy
In contrast to the case where the demand shock is absent, the monetary authority
must now consider the IS curve in the optimization approach.
Inserting the Phillips curve and the Euler consumption equation in the social
loss function and optimizing the resulting expression with respect to the output gap
delivers the following ﬁrst-order condition
λ(x − xT) + δ(π − πT) −
γ
b
(i − iT) = 0
⇔ i − iT =
λb
γ
(x − xT) +
bδ
γ
(π − πT) (B.7)
Inserting (1) and re-arranging yields
x = xT +
bγ
λb2(πe − πT) −
δb2
λb2 + γ
(π − πT) +
γδ
λb2 + γ
ε1 + ε2 (B.8)








24The solution of the output gap is then given by
π|
′





b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε1 +
λb2 + γ
b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε2 (B.10)






b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε1 −
δb2
b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε2 (B.11)
The solution of the nominal interest rate is ﬁnally obtained by inserting (B.10) and
(B.11) in (B.7)





b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε1 +
δb
b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε2 (B.12)
B.3 Inconsistent monetary policy
The proceeding is totally analogous to the main text. Therefore, we will only present
the resulting solutions of the output gap, the inﬂation rate, and the nominal interest
rate. They are given by
π|
′
IP − πT =
(λb2 + γ)(1 + b(kx + δkπ)) + δb2(γkx − λb)




b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε1 +
λb2 + γ




IP − xT =
γ(1 + bkx) − δb(1 + b(kx + δkπ) − δb)




b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε1 −
δb2
b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε2 (B.14)
i|IP − iT =
λb(1 + bkx) + δ(1 + b(kx + δ(kπ + bkx)))




b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε1 +
δb
b2(λ + δ2) + γ
ε2 (B.15)
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